

# Regime Switching Consistent Expectations Equilibria: General Results with Application to Monetary Policy

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# Introduction

- Rational Expectations (RE): realistic assumption?
  - ▶ Agents know everything about the true underlying model of the economy.
  - ▶ Have a lot of computational power to solve the model.
  - ▶ One needs to impose a lot of structural frictions to replicate certain data features.
- One way of departing from RE
  - ▶ Stochastic Consistent Expectations (SCE)

# Introduction

- What are SCE?
  - ▶ Agents have no knowledge of the true underlying model of the economy.
  - ▶ They form expectations based on a *mis-specified* perceived law of motion (PLM).
  - ▶ When moments of the data match the perceived ones from the PLM, agents believe their PLM is correct.
  - ▶ Whenever there is a moments' match, *self-confirming* restricted perception equilibrium arises instead of the RE one.

# This paper

- Lays out the framework of how to work with SCE in a N-regime switching univariate generic model (contribution).
  - ▶ Sufficient conditions under which at least a SCEE is guaranteed.
- Incorporates SCE in an exogenous regime switching model (contribution).
  - ▶ Fisherian equation combined with Taylor-type of monetary policy (MP).
  - ▶ MP switches aggressiveness following an exogenous Markov chain.

# Literature Review

- Exogenous regime switching with fully rational agents
  - ▶ **Davig and Leeper ('07, AER)**
  - ▶ Farmer et. al. ('10, AER)
- Behavioral learning equilibria
  - ▶ **Hommes and Zhu ('14, JET)**
- Moments computations in Markov switching models
  - ▶ Bianchi ('16, JE)
  - ▶ Cho ('16, RED)

# Generic Framework

## Model

$$x_t = a(s_t) + b(s_t)\tilde{E}_t x_{t+1} + c(s_t)y_t + u_t \quad (1)$$

$$y_t = \rho y_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t \quad (2)$$

$$\varepsilon_t \sim \text{iid}(\bar{\varepsilon}, \sigma_{\varepsilon}^2) \quad (3)$$

$$u_t \sim \text{iid}(\bar{u}, \sigma_u^2) \quad (4)$$

where

- $s_t \in \{1, 2, \dots, N\}$  with exogenous transition prob.  
 $p_{ij} = \text{Prob}(s_t = j \mid s_{t-1} = i)$
- Ergodic Markov-chain transition matrix

$$P = \begin{bmatrix} p_{11} & p_{12} & \dots & p_{1N} \\ p_{21} & p_{22} & \dots & p_{2N} \\ \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots \\ p_{N1} & p_{N2} & \dots & p_{NN} \end{bmatrix}$$

# Generic Framework

## Bounded Rationality, PLM

- Agents do not know the economy is driven by  $y_t$  and  $u_t$
- They do not know there is a regime switch in the economy

## Perceived Law of Motion (PLM)

$$x_t = \alpha + \beta(x_{t-1} - \alpha) + \delta_t \quad (5)$$

where

- $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$
- $\beta \in (-1, 1)$
- $\delta_t \sim \text{WN}$

## Forecast

$$\tilde{E}_t x_{t+1} = \alpha + \beta^2(x_{t-1} - \alpha) \quad (6)$$

# Generic Framework

## Bounded Rationality, ALM

Actual Law of Motion (ALM):

$$x_t = k_i + l_i x_{t-1} + m_i y_t + u_t \quad (7)$$

where

- $k_i = a(s_t = i) + \alpha(1 - \beta^2)b(s_t = i)$
- $l_i = \beta^2 b(s_t = i)$
- $m_i = c(s_t = i)$

for any  $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, N\}$ .

# Generic Framework

## SCEE Definition

**Definition.**  $(\alpha, \beta)$  where  $\alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{R}$  and  $\beta \in (-1, 1)$ , is called a first-order SCEE if the following three conditions are satisfied:

- The ALM has unconditional mean  $\alpha$ , i.e.,  $\mathbb{E}(x_t \mid \text{ALM}) = \alpha$
- The ALM has unconditional first-order autocorrelation coefficient  $\beta \in (-1, 1)$ , i.e.,  $\text{Corr}(x_t, x_{t-1} \mid \text{ALM}) = \beta$

## Application: Model

$$R_t = \tilde{E}_t \pi_{t+1} + r_t \quad (8)$$

$$r_t = \rho r_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t \quad (9)$$

$$R_t = \phi_i (\pi_t - \pi_t^*) \quad (10)$$

$$\pi_t = \frac{1}{\phi_i} \tilde{E}_t \pi_{t+1} + \frac{1}{\phi_i} r_t + \pi_t^* \quad (11)$$

- $\phi_i$  – MP aggressiveness in regime  $i$ ,  $i \in \{1, 2\}$ .
- Regimes switch according to an exo Markov chain with transition prob.
  - ▶  $p_{ij} = P[s_t = j \mid s_{t-1} = i]$
- $\pi_t^* \sim N(0, \sigma_\pi^2)$
- $\varepsilon_t \sim N(0, \sigma_\varepsilon^2)$

# Actual Law of Motion (ALM)

Using the generic framework, the model implies the following state-dependent ALM:

$$\pi_t = \frac{\delta(1 - \gamma^2)}{\phi_i} + \frac{\gamma^2}{\phi_i} \pi_{t-1} + \frac{1}{\phi_i} r_t + \pi_t^* \quad (12)$$

# Guaranteed Existence

**Proposition 1.** Given  $\phi_i > \sqrt{p_{ii}}$ , for any  $i \in \{1, 2\}$ , a **sufficient** condition for the existence of at least one SCEE  $(\alpha^*, \beta^*)$  is


$$(1 - \phi_2^2)p_{11} + (1 - \phi_1^2)p_{22} + \phi_1^2\phi_2^2 > 1 \quad (13)$$

**Remark.** Davig and Leeper (AER, '07) show that, given  $\phi_i > p_{ii}$  for any  $i \in \{1, 2\}$ , a unique bounded REE exists if

$$(1 - \phi_2)p_{11} + (1 - \phi_1)p_{22} + \phi_1\phi_2 > 1 \quad (14)$$

i.e., if the Long-Run Taylor Principle (LRTP) holds

# Guaranteed Existence



# Relative Moments

$$\text{Relative Moment} = \text{Moment}_{\text{SCE}} / \text{Moment}_{\text{RE}}$$

# Relative Moments



**Relative Moment** =  $\text{Moment}_{\text{SCE}} / \text{Moment}_{\text{RE}}$

- **Mean:**  $\alpha^* = 0$  ( $= \text{mean}_{\text{RE}}$ )

# Relative Moments

**Relative Moment** =  $\text{Moment}_{\text{SCE}} / \text{Moment}_{\text{RE}}$



- **Mean:**  $\alpha^* = 0$  ( $= \text{mean}_{\text{RE}}$ )
- **Relative Volatility & Persistence:**



Parametrization:  $\phi_1 = 1.5$ ,  $\phi_2 = 0.9$ ,  $p_{11} = 0.85$ ,  $\rho = 0.8$ ,  $\frac{\sigma_{\pi^*}^2}{\sigma_{\varepsilon}^2} = 1$



# Existence

Calibration:  $\rho = 0.8$ ,  $\frac{\sigma_{\pi^*}^2}{\sigma_{\varepsilon}^2} = 1$



Multiplicity

# Inflation Dynamics




# Sample Autocorrelation Learning (SAC)

- $\alpha_t = \frac{1}{t+1} \sum_{j=0}^t \pi_j$
- $\beta_t = \frac{\sum_{j=0}^{t-1} (\pi_j - \alpha_t)(\pi_{j-1} - \alpha_t)}{\sum_{i=0}^t (\pi_i - \alpha_t)^2}$

**Proposition 2.** A SCEE equilibrium  $(0, \beta^*)$  is stable under SAC-learning if

$$\frac{\partial \mathbb{E}(\pi_t)}{\partial \alpha} \Big|_{(0, \beta^*)} < 1 \text{ and } \frac{\partial \text{Corr}(\pi_t, \pi_{t-1})}{\partial \beta} \Big|_{(0, \beta^*)} < 1$$

# Sample Autocorrelation Learning (SAC)



# Concluding Remarks

- The LRTP needed for a determinate REE does not eliminate fluctuations driven by bounded rationality.
- A wide variety of policy combinations induces equilibria with excess inflation persistence.
- The combination of an active with a persistently passive enough rule induces excess inflation volatility.
- Convergence to the equilibrium happens faster the less the passive regime lasts.

# Multiplicity of SCEE

